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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joey Edward Hall appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation claiming (1) the district court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into
his request for substitute counsel and in failing to appoint substitute counsel; and
(2) the district court abused its discretion by denying Rule 35 relief after revoking
Hall's probation.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Hall with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.1819, 43-44.)

Hall's case was eventually transferred to drug court and the court

entered a withheld judgment and order of probation. (R., pp.81, 84-86.) Less
than two months later, on August 21, 2008, the court ordered Hall to serve six
days on the Sheriff's Work Detail as a result of Hall's violation of the rules of Drug
Court. (R., p.90.) Just shy of two months after that, the court again ordered Hall
to serve 2 days on the Sheriff's Work Detail for again violating the rules of Drug
Court. (R., p.92.) Seven months later, the court ordered Hall to serve three days
in jail due to another violation. (R., p.99.) Hall was subsequently arrested on a
"Drug Court Bench Warrant" (R., p.101) after which the state filed a motion to
revoke Hall's probation based on a number of violations, including an allegation
that Hall was "terminated from Drug Court" on October 28, 2009 (R., pp.112122).
On December 10, 2009, approximately three weeks after the state filed its
motion to revoke probation, an order was entered expelling Hall from Drug Court.
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(R., p.134.)

Hall admitted he violated his probation by being "terminated from

Drug Court due to his continued drug and alcohol consumption and noncompliance" and the state dismissed four additional allegations.

(R., pp.117,

146.)
Three months after admitting he violated his probation, but prior to
disposition, Hall filed a motion to withdraw that admission on the grounds that
"the probation violation was filed [sic] prematurely."

(R., p.154.)

The court

conducted a hearing on Hall's motion after which it allowed Hall to withdraw his
admission to violating his probation, and the court scheduled an evidentiary
hearing. (R., p.161.)
Following the probation violation evidentiary hearing, the court found Hall
violated three conditions of his probation. (R., pp.163-165.)

Consistent with the

state's recommendation, the court revoked Hall's probation and entered
judgment, imposing a unified five-year sentence with two years fixed, but
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.176, 179-180.) The court subsequently placed Hall
on probation. (R., pp.184-196.)
Less than one month after the court gave Hall his second chance on
probation, the state filed a motion to revoke his probation. (R., pp.201-207.) At
the evidentiary hearing on the alleged probation violations, Hall requested the
appointment of new counsel. (R., p.242; 3/9/2011 Tr., p.5. Ls.9-11.) The basis
for Hall's request was a claim he was not satisfied with counsel because she had
not made any "attempt to come and see [him] to discuss [his] case," had "failed
to put in a couple of different motions [he] asked for," would not "answer [his]
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calls," and had "not collected any of the evidence [he] asked her to." (3/9/2011
Tr., p.5, Ls.12-17.)

After further colloquy regarding the reasons for Hall's

request, the court advised Hall he could hire his own attorney but it was not going
to appoint new counsel because Hall failed to provide any valid basis for doing
so.

(3/9/2011 Tr., p.5, L.18 - p.7, L.17.)

The court then proceeded to the

evidentiary hearing after which it found Hall violated three conditions of his
probation. (3/9/2011 Tr., pp.10-48; R., p.243.) Following a disposition hearing,
the court revoked Hall's probation and ordered his sentence executed.

(R.,

pp.244-248; see generally 3/21/2011 Tr.) Hall filed a Rule 35 motion (R., pp.249251 ), which the court denied (R., pp.273-275).
Hall filed a notice of appeal timely from the court's order revoking
probation. (R., pp.256-258.)
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ISSUES
Hall states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err when the court failed to conduct a
sufficient inquiry of Mr. Hall and his trial counsel upon Mr. Hall's
request for appointment of substitute counsel for his probation
revocation proceedings, and in failing to appoint substitute counsel
for Mr. Hall?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when the court
denied Mr. Hall's Rule 35 motion seeking lenience in sentencing
following the revocation of Mr. Hall's probation?
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Hall failed to establish that the district court's inquiry into his request
for substitute counsel was inadequate or that the court erred by denying his
request for new counsel?
2.
Has Hall failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in
denying his Rule 35 motion?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Hall Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Inquiry Into His Request For
Substitute Counsel Was Inadequate Or That The District Court Erred In Denying
The Request

A

Introduction
Hall claims the district court erred by failing to adequately inquire into his

request for substitute counsel. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Hall alternatively argues
that even if the Court finds the district court's inquiry sufficient, the district court
erred in failing to appoint substitute counsel.

(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Both of

Hall's claims fail.

B.

Stand a rd Of Review
The decision whether to appoint substitute counsel is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Lippert, 2012 WL 1330947 *2 (Ct. App. 2012).

C.

Hall Had A Full And Fair Opportunity To Present The Reasons For His
Request For Substitute Counsel
An indigent defendant has a constitutional right to counsel during

probation revocation proceedings. State v. King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d
352, 354 (Ct. App. 1998). "[F]or good cause a trial court may, in its discretion,
appoint a substitute attorney for an indigent defendant." Lippert at *2 (citations
omitted); I.C. § 19-856. When a defendant requests substitute counsel, the court
"must afford [him] a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in
support of a motion for substitution of counsel after having been made aware of
the problems involved."

kt

The court's inquiry must include "some reasonable,
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nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's complaints" and
the court must "apprise itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the
defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the
point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that his
or her Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for substitution."

kl

Hall asserts "the trial court erred when [it] failed to conduct a full and fair
hearing, as required by law, upon his request for substitute counsel . . . . "
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

The specific inadequacies in the court's inquiry Hall

asserts on appeal are the court's failure to ask trial counsel about Hall's concerns
and the court's response to Hall's complaints about counsel. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.7-11.) The court's duty to afford Hall a full and fair opportunity to present the
reasons for his request for substitute counsel does not, however, include an
obligation to ask for trial counsel's opinion on the motion, nor are the court's
comments in response to Hall's request relevant to the adequacy of Hall's
opportunity to present his reasons.
As soon as Hall advised the court that he wanted new counsel, the court
inquired as to the reasons for the request and gave Hall the opportunity to state
his reasons on the record. Hall does not explain why, or cite any authority for the
proposition that, trial counsel's input was necessary to complete Hall's own
opportunity to air his complaints to the court. The law only requires the court to
"afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons
in support of a motion for substitution of counsel." Lippert, 2012 WL 1330947 *2.

6

It does not require the court to give trial counsel the opportunity to rebut the
defendant's arguments. Hall's contrary assertion lacks merit.
Hall also contends the district court's inquiry was insufficient because,
after he advised the court of his concerns with counsel's representation, "the
district court merely disregarded [his] allegations by telling him that he could
always hire a private lawyer if he so wished and that, 'that's kind of the way this
works."' (Appellant's Brief, p.10 (citing 3/9/2011 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.5).) While
the court's response may be relevant to Hall's argument that the court erred in
denying his request, it is not relevant to whether he had a full and fair opportunity
to present his complaints to the court.

Hall's reliance on the Idaho Supreme

Court's opinion in State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 52 P.3d 857 (2002), does not
support a contrary conclusion.
In Nath, the defendant "submitted a pro se motion for substitute counsel"
in which he "named four witnesses that his court-appointed attorney had not
interviewed and also mentioned five documents that he thought the attorney
should have obtained." 137 Idaho at 714, 52 P.3d at 859. "Nath was not allowed
~

to speak on the subject" of his motion.

at 715, 52 P.3d at 860. The Court,

after noting the district court's "obligation to afford a defendant a full and fair
opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for
substitution of counsel," concluded the district court failed to satisfy this obligation
because Nath "was not given the opportunity to explain his problems, and the
[court's] review of his motion did not encompass the totality of his claims."
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~

Unlike in Nath, the trial court in this case gave Hall the "opportunity to
explain his problems." Hall has failed to establish the opportunity afforded him
was inadequate.

D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Hall's Request
For Substitute Counsel
Hall also contends that the district court erred in denying his request for

substitute counsel, arguing he established good cause for substitution.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.) Application of the relevant law to the reasons for
Hall's request reveals otherwise.
Good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel "includes an actual
conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication; or an
irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict." Lippert, 2012
WL 1330947 *2. It appears Hall believes he was entitled to the appointment of
substitute counsel based upon an "irrevocable breakdown in communication"
because of counsel's alleged failure to meet with him prior to the March 9
evidentiary hearing on the alleged probation violations.

(Appellant's Brief, p.12-

13.) Hall's own representations at that hearing contradict this assertion. While
Hall advised the court that counsel had not been to see him and had not
answered his calls, he also represented that he did speak with counsel when he
appeared in court "on the misdemeanor." (3/9/2011 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-10.) At that
time, he told counsel he wanted her to move to continue the probation violation
evidentiary hearing, which, according to Hall, she agreed to do. (3/9/2011 Tr.,
p.6, Ls.11-15.) Hall also told the court that counsel failed to "collect[] any of the
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evidence [he] asked her to" collect.

(3/9/2011 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-17.) Thus, it is

clear from Hall's own statements that he in fact had some communication with
counsel prior to the evidentiary hearing. That counsel did not interact with Hall
as much as he would have liked does not demonstrate an "irrevocable
breakdown in communication." 1 See Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1326 (9

th

Cir. 1994) ("there is no constitutional right to a particular degree of preparation for
trial"); United States v. Olson, 846 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7 th Cir. 1988) ("We know of
no case establishing a minimum number of meetings between counsel and client
prior to trial necessary to prepare an attorney to provide effective assistance of
counsel."). Nor does counsel's failure to file a motion to continue the probation
demonstrate good cause.

The good cause standard for the appointment of

substitute counsel is not satisfied simply because appointed counsel refuses to
pursue motions merely because the client asks counsel to do so. See State v.

1

On a related point, Hall argues that the district court erred by responding to
Hall's complaints about the frequency of his interaction with counsel by stating,
"that's kind of the way this works." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) According to Hall,
"[t]his aspect of the court's determination is inconsistent with the legal standards
attendant to the district court's discretion" because, he argues, "[t]he existence of
systematic failures of appointed counsel to consult with his or her clients does
not excuse the obligations of counsel imposed by the constitutions of the United
States and the State of Idaho." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) This argument ignores
both the context in which the court made the statement and presupposes
counsel's performance was constitutionally inadequate. The court's comment
that, "that's kind of the way this works," followed the statement, "It may not be
that the exact schedule that you wish you had in terms of how much contact you
have with your lawyer." (3/9/2011 Tr., p.6, L.24 - p.7, L.5.) It was not improper
for the court to essentially put Hall on notice that his attorney was not required to
accommodate his "exact schedule." Further, Hall's presupposition that counsel's
level of interaction with him was constitutionally inadequate is also unsupported
by any evidence. Hall implicitly acknowledges as much by his footnote reserving
the right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel through a postconviction petition. (Appellant's Brief, p.11 n.3.)
9

Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 336, 193 P.3d 878, 883 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Notably, the
right to counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one's choice,
and mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily
grounds for substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.")
(citations omitted); Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct.
App. 2007) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)) ("An indigent
defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed appellate
counsel to press all nonfrivolous arguments that the defendant wishes to
pursue.").
One additional factor is worth noting with respect to Hall's claim that he
was entitled to substitute counsel at the time of his probation evidentiary hearing.
As noted by the district court in response to Hall's request for new counsel, Hall
was previously represented by court-appointed counsel, Kelly Whiting, and was
"unhappy with his representation" as well.

(3/9/2011 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-12.)

For

reasons that are not clear in the record, on February 16, 2011, the court
appointed Virginia Bond to replace Kelly Whiting as Hall's attorney. (R., Vol. I,
p.234.) It is hardly surprising that Ms. Bond was unable to meet with Hall beyond
the meeting they had in court when Hall told her he wanted her to file a motion to
continue in the short timeframe between her appointment on February 16, 2011,
and the March 9, 2011 probation evidentiary hearing where Hall requested yet
another attorney. Hall's claim that he was entitled to new counsel based upon an
"irrevocable breakdown in communication" on the circumstances present in this
case fails.

This is especially true given Hall's failure to highlight any actual
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deficiency in Ms. Bond's representation at the March 9 hearing or anytime
thereafter. See Lippert at *4 (rejecting claim of entitlement to substitute counsel
and noting actions counsel took in representing defendant).
Because Hall has failed to establish error in either the court's inquiry into
his request for substitute counsel, or in the court's decision not to appoint
counsel, Hall has failed to establish he is entitled to reversal of his judgment.

II.
Hall Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Hall asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35

motion. A review of the record shows Hall failed to provide the district court with
any new information that would warrant a reduction of his sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether to reduce a sentence following the revocation of probation is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218
P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Hall must "show that the
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sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion."

~

Hall asserts the district court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35
motion, arguing that he presented new information that would warrant relief and
that "a review of the entire record in this case demonstrates . . . his overall
rehabilitative potential." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Both of these arguments lack
merit.
The information Hall characterizes as "new" is his "willingness to submit to
additional supervision and oversight of his activities through GPS monitoring if
placed back on probation."

(Appellant's Brief, p.17.)

A "willingness" to be

monitored while on probation is not "new." Hall's request to be placed back on
probation implied a "willingness" to be subject to whatever terms and conditions
the court deemed appropriate, including a "willingness" to be monitored, which is
the purpose of probation in the first place. That Hall later advised the court that
he would be "willing" to be monitored in a particular fashion is surely not the type
of "new" information contemplated by Rule 35.
Hall's second argument is predicated on an erroneous understanding of
the law and a factual basis that is belied by the record.

With respect to the

former, Hall, relying on Hanington, supra, contends this Court's review of the
district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion "encompass[es] events before
and after the original judgment" including a revie~ of "the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) The state
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submits this argument reflects an unwarranted expansion of Hanington. While it
is true that Hanington allows for a broad scope of review when a district court
revokes a defendant's probation and imposes sentence, where, as here, the
defendant challenges a specific decision that was based on a specific argument,
appellate review should be limited accordingly. Thus, it is the state's position that
because Hall's specific claim on appeal is that the district court erred in denying
his Rule 35 motion, which was based solely on Hall's willingness to "agree to
GPS monitoring if [he] could be placed on probation to work" (R., p.249;

also

(p.250 (requesting "leniency in his case for the above stated reasons,"

i.e., the

willingness to agree to GPS monitoring)), this Court should only evaluate whether
the district court abused its discretion in rejecting this request and conclude that it
did not for the reasons stated above.
Even if this Court considers the entirety of the record in determining
whether the court abused its discretion by denying Hall's Rule 35 motion, Hall's
claim that he has "rehabilitative potential" is belied by the record. Hall correctly
notes that during his stint in the retained jurisdiction program, it was reported that
his efforts "should prove to be beneficial" after leaving the facility and that he
received a recommendation of probation. (Appellant's Brief, p.18 (quoting APSI,
p.3).) Hall, however, ignores the fact that NICl's probation recommendation was
a reluctant one. As noted in the APSI:
I still have concern, because [Hall) has demonstrated a limited
amount of progress and has demonstrated that he will only accept
feedback from both me and his peers in a very reluctant manner.
Overall, his progress at NICI has been mediocre at best and he will
most definitely pose a challenge to whoever supervises him in the
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community, but mediocre progress is still change in the right
direction.
(APSI, pp.4-5.)
Hall also ignores the fact that the court followed the probation
recommendation only to have Hall violate again within a month.

As predicted,

Hall "pose[d] a challenge" after being given another chance at probation. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Hall's Rule 35 request for yet
another opportunity on probation.

CONCLUSION

The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order revoking Hall's probation and ordering his sentence executed and the
district court's order denying Rule 35 relief.
DATED this 13th day of June, 2012.

JESSIC
Deputy
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of June 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

JMUpm
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